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Abstract: This article charts the rise of criminal vetting by employers and voluntary organisations in 
England and Wales. It examines the historical roots of vetting and its progress from being initially a 
marginal concern for specialised groups to its position as an integral part of the recruitment process 
for over 3,000,000 people per annum by 2007. Critical exploration of this shift is provided – key 
events such as the Conservative government consultation of the early 1990’s and the incremental 
implementation of its recommendations are re-evaluated. This article identifies and examines the 
correlation between the media reporting of, and subsequent public reaction to, a series of high profile 
child murders and the response of the legislature and the judiciary to these which lead ultimately to 
the development of a vetting epidemic in England and Wales by 2007. The role played in this 
development by vested interests, such as voluntary groups and employers, will be traced and 
critiqued, along with the missed opportunities for reform which might have prevented the epidemic’s 
spread. 
 
Introduction 
The last few years have been quite remarkable so far as criminal records in England and Wales are 
concerned. A public and media backlash1 against ‘the vetting epidemic’2 seems to have set in while 
the Government have acted with surprising haste – firstly convening an independent review into the 
existing vetting regime, secondly by implementing a raft of amendments to criminal records 
legislation as recommended by that review and then thirdly, without almost any discernible warning, 
by dismantling the Criminal Records Bureau (‘the CRB’) and replacing it with the Disclosure and 
Barring Service (‘the DBS’). 
 
This article provides a much needed context for the recent tumult by examining the rise of the vetting 
regime in England and Wales. This will highlight key staging posts in the metamorphosis of the 
system from a marginal and piecemeal administrative data collation exercise into a multi-million 
pound commercial operation which affects millions of citizens per annum. The author will identify a 
number of critical turning points for reform, including the comprehensive government consultation 
and review in 1993, and will show that a number of opportunities for effective development and 
reform have been missed. 
 
The author demonstrates that this transition came initially through a gradual, almost imperceptible 
creeping growth of localised schemes which allowed for increased levels of employment screening 
followed by a combination of pressure applied by vested interests entreating for greater levels of 
disclosure and a reactionary process stemming from a number of highly emotive and well-publicised 
child murder cases, rather than by predetermined policy grounds. This correlation between high-
profile child abduction cases and increased demands for vetting has often been presumed but rarely 
extrapolated fully. Here it will be contended that three particular incidents, namely the murders of 
                                                          
1 T. Thomas, ‘Old Criminal records Playing a Familiar Tune’ (2012) 176 JPN 539 
2 T. Pitt-Payne, ‘Employment - The Shadow of the Past’ (2009) 159 NLJ 1530 and R. Scorer, ‘A Vetting 
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Marie Payne in 1983, Sarah Payne in 2000 and Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in 2002, created an 
unprecedented and wholly disproportionate climate of fear and mistrust which generated a perfect 
breeding ground for invasive criminal vetting. It is submitted that this heightened concern of 
paedophiles and of ‘stranger-danger’ justified, and indeed positively encouraged, a rapid expansion of 
criminal record checks far beyond that initially envisaged under the legislative framework. Some of 
the more excessive examples of vetting in individual cases and the application of general vetting 
principles will be highlighted to demonstrate the scale of criminal checks which, by 2007, had reached 
epidemic levels.      
 
Vetting – a potted history 
The system of criminal vetting in England and Wales via a single, designated, centralised organisation 
has in situ for only thirteen years.3 That is not to say that vetting is a new phenomenon in the UK; in 
fact there is a history which can be traced back to the 1740’s when Henry Fielding first took the 
names of convicted offenders at Bow Street Magistrates Court.4 This list formed the ‘Universal 
Register Office’ in 1749.5  
 
By 1863, the Chief Constable of Lincolnshire was ‘constantly receiving letters from private enquiry 
offices seeking information as to the character, respectability and money value of persons residing in 
the towns and villages’6. Victorian politicians, apparently wary that the scaling back of capital 
punishment and the transportation of offenders on hulks to Australia might mean that there were more 
criminals re-entering society, decided to keep records relating to them and implemented the Habitual 
Criminals Act 1869 to ensure that such records were retained in England and Ireland.7 The Prevention 
of Crimes Act 1871 did likewise for Scotland and between them these Acts laid the responsibility for 
maintaining records squarely with the police where, save for a period between 1876 and 1896 when 
the task was transferred to the Home Office, responsibility still lies today.  To facilitate this, the police 
opened the Criminal Records Office at Scotland Yard in 1913 to store, in hard-copy, criminal 
records.8 
 
An examination of the system during the middle part of the 20th century demonstrates a prevailing 
attitude towards vetting far removed from that of today. In 1954, a working party of Chief Police 
Officers (under the chairmanship of the Home Office) published a circular which provided that: 
 
It has been a fundamental rule that police information should not be used except for the 
purposes for which it was acquired, and therefore that it should not be disclosed to persons in 
authority, however, responsible, other than those concerned with police functions, unless the 
consideration of public interest is sufficiently weighty to justify departure from this general 
rule...A person who has served his sentence or otherwise paid the penalty for a crime should 
not, by artificial action, be placed in a position where he finds it impossible to rehabilitate 
himself and build a new and honest life.9  
 
                                                          
3 S. Room, ‘Meeting the challenges of Climbie and Soham – part 3’ (2004) 154 NLJ 590 
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In 1967 the Criminal Law Act repealed the two Victorian Acts and, such was the lackadaisical attitude 
to criminal vetting, from 1967 to 1984 there appears to have been no statutory basis for the collection 
of records at all.10 A Home Office review of the overarching policy stipulated in the 1954 circular was 
undertaken in 1973 and resulted in a new circular11 which decreed that the status quo be maintained – 
criminal records were to remain confidential save in the limited circumstances where probity of law, 
national security or the protection of vulnerable adults required otherwise.12  
 
In the rare circumstances that a request was made for a report, what was compiled was a ‘Police 
Report of Character’; a written report outlining convictions held on the local constabulary database 
and the Police National Computer (PNC) at New Scotland Yard, information regarding pending cases 
and ‘other factual material, such as, for example, might be admissible in court’.13 The latter might, 
and indeed did, include information regarding acquittals, cases where proceedings were commenced 
but dropped through lack of evidence, allegations of child abuse which were unfounded and indeed 
information regarding abuse suffered by the applicant as a child (on the grounds that the abused are 
more likely to become the abuser as adults).14 
 
Even where reports were issued they were often inaccurate, out of date or simply plain wrong; when 
James Rule wrote of his experience at the Criminal Records Office in the 1970’s he spoke of records 
‘entered in large manila folders, filed numerically according to the sequence of their creation, and 
shelved very nearly from floor to ceiling in row after row of racks (which) give the distinct impression 
of the stacks of a closed-access library.’15 Rule noted that a simple request for an antecedent history 
was plagued by problems; contents of the records and recording practices varied hugely ‘according to 
the habits of the police force’,16 there were often unacceptable delays and indeed ‘one regional official 
even reports obtaining ‘no trace’ reports on persons known with certainty to have criminal records, 
suggesting that the frustrated staff of the London offices have simply refused to check the files as 
requested’.17  
 
Moving the goalposts: Marie Payne 
 
It will never be possible to take all risk out of situations in which people are placed in 
positions of trust or have responsibility for the young and vulnerable. There is a price to be 
paid for the mitigation of risk and in the case of vetting it involves the invasion of personal 
privacy and, however carefully implemented, the likelihood of some people being denied jobs 
for reasons which are unfair or unjustified. Vetting can only remove a small amount of risk 
and can lead to complacency in personnel practices, which in themselves may add to the 
risks’.18  
 
By combination of creeping statutory incrementation, the establishment of various local vetting 
schemes and the rather inviting fact that the cost of a police check was at that time borne by the 
                                                          
10 See Thomas, above n.8 
11 Home Office, Police reports of convictions and related information, circular no. 140/1973 
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15 J. Rule, Private Lives and Public Surveillance (Allen Lane: London, 1973) 49  
16 J. Rule, Private Lives and Public Surveillance (Allen Lane: London, 1973) 51 
17 J. Rule, Private Lives and Public Surveillance (Allen Lane: London, 1973) 69 
18 Above n.9 at 29 
vetting police force, the lackadaisical attitude to criminal records began to change.19 Many of the local 
schemes which had been instituted related to security staff working at bars and clubs and other 
working people who did not deal with children or vulnerable people but were rather employed in 
positions where they held (sometimes little more than a rudimentary) position of trust; one example 
cited included vetting for those who installed burglar alarms in residential areas.20 This demonstrated 
the development of a new, fourth justification for vetting – that of crime prevention.  
 
The system of vetting came under sustained and widespread attack after four-year-old Marie Payne 
disappeared from her local park in Dagenham on 11 March 1983. Despite an extensive search and 
considerable media coverage, there was no trace of the girl for six months until the tattered and 
bloody remnants of her clothes were recovered from a tree in Epping Forest and it was not until 
another year later that Colin Evans, a local lorry driver arrested whilst trying to abduct two other 
children in the area, confessed to Marie’s murder and led police to the location of her buried body. 
She had been savagely beaten and sexually assaulted before being murdered.21 Evans was convicted 
of the murder in December 1984 in a trial that received extensive media attention – two tabloid 
newspapers allocated five pages each to the story22 – and it soon emerged that Evans had an extensive 
history of sexual offences. Moreover, thanks to the efforts of his probation worker in recommending 
him to a Christian voluntary organisation (without disclosing his criminal past), Evans was able to 
establish himself as a credible and trustworthy individual who ultimately set up a babysitting 
organisation.23  
 
The press and public reacted with fury, directed variously at Evans, the probation officer and the 
vetting system itself, and there were calls for a public enquiry and the establishment of a register for 
sex offenders.24  These were resisted but s.27(4) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
reintroduced a statutory requirement for the collation of criminal records and conferred upon the 
Home Secretary the power to regulate on criminal record matters. An interdepartmental working party 
was also established and its recommendations, namely that those who worked with children or who 
would have substantial access to children should be routinely checked through a specified process, 
were initially proposed and then fully outlined by a pair of Home Office circulars published in 1986.25 
These effectively expunged all previous vetting guidance and established a system of routine checks 
for child-care workers and teachers by which a local authority looking to employ to those positions 
could ask the police to search the PNC and report back as to the information held.  
 
1986 has subsequently been described as ‘the big leap forward’ so far as vetting is concerned.26 It had 
been estimated that some 100,000 checks per annum would be processed under the new regime27 but 
a considerable change of heart at the Home Office saw the publication of no less than eight further 
circulars in seven years which significantly widened the vetting net to include NHS staff, agency staff, 
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20 Ibid 
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22 B. Franklin, Social Policy, the Media and Misrepresentation (Routledge: London, 1999) 96 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Home Office Circular 44/1986, which was then almost immediately superseded by Home Office, Police 
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26 T. Thomas, ‘The One Stop Shop’ (2 March 2001) 151 NLJ 298  
27 Above n.9 at 28 
students, volunteers, those who worked in residential care, bailiffs and taxi-drivers28 to name but 
some of the twenty or so different posts where checks were now required.29 Whilst this significant 
policy shift ‘sparked hardly a ripple of public or professional debate’,30 it was positively encouraged 
by the voluntary and care sectors: one social care journal stated that ‘everyone in social work should 
welcome last week's government circular giving local authorities power to check on the 
criminal records of people wanting to work with children’31 while voluntary organisations such as the 
NSPCC and Barnardos lobbied vociferously for inclusion.32 Fifteen other organisations, including 
fire-services and a board of school governors, applied to be able to obtain records but were refused as 
calls were made to include private security staff, nannies and those working with vulnerable adults in 
the vetting regime.33  
 
Meanwhile, those excluded often vitiated this by requiring prospective employees to access their 
criminal record through a subject-access request under s.21 of the Data Protection Act 1984 – the so-
called ‘Do-It-Yourself check’. The Data Protection Registrar thought this method so contrary to the 
spirit of the data protection legislation that it ought be criminalised.34 There were some concerns 
raised that ‘irrelevant’ material was being disclosed but these were ‘muted by the overriding concern 
to protect children’.35  
 
As the net widened, the problems mounted. In October 1986, the press reported that a woman was 
refused a position in a special programme for delinquent teenagers after police mistook her for 
another person who shared the same maiden name and disclosed that person’s criminal record.36 The 
London Criminal Courts Solicitors’ Association publicly declared that bail and sentencing decisions 
were being made on the basis of inaccurate antecedent information.37  
 
In 1990, the Law Society claimed that criminal records were ‘in a terrifying state of inaccuracy’38 – an 
allegation which so alarmed a Home Office Affairs Committee that they broke off their intended 
review of the Crown Prosecution Service to first conduct one into criminal records. The committee 
affirmed the Law Society’s claim and found that over 30,000 records had not been updated after two 
and half years had passed since a recordable change of circumstances.39 A Scrutiny Committee was 
appointed to investigate the situation further40 and it found that the criminal record collection was ‘in 
a very unsatisfactory state’ and recommended that a new agency be created to act as custodian of the 
records collection.41  
 
                                                          
28 Ibid. at 25 – 26  
29 Ibid. at 5 
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35 Thomas, above n.32 
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37 Thomas, above n.7 at 890 
38 Home Affairs Committee, Criminal Records – Third Report, HC285 (1989 – 90) para.1 
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40 Home Office, The Government Reply to the Third Report from the Home Affairs Committee, Cm 1163 (1989 
– 90) 
41 Thomas, above n.7 at 891 
Against this backdrop of slow, inaccurate and incomplete data collection and supply, the number of 
checks being requested was escalating dramatically and by 1993 the system was close to breaking 
point; the number of checks being processed by police forces per year amounted to some 665,000 in 
respect of ‘child protection’ positions, 97,200 taxi-drivers and 150,000 others (excluding national 
security). These figures represented a 30% increase on the previous year.42 With all costs borne by the 
police, the estimated cost to the taxpayer of administering these checks had risen to £14m per year.43 
According to Thomas, this was ‘all evidence of a growing culture of demand for disclosure’.44  
 
An epidemic proposition – the 1993 Review  
 
Faced with an expensive and increasingly unmanageable situation, the Conservative government 
issued a consultation paper in September 199345 which outlined in full the significant, inherent flaws 
in the vetting system at that point. This highlighted, among other concerns, the strain being placed on 
police to handle requests, the inconsistency between forces in interpreting the circulars and deciding 
what should be disclosed, the growing cost, and that, even at this point: 
 
There is evidence that the system is being misused to obtain checks on individuals whose 
access (to children) is limited. At a time of heightened awareness of child abuse, 
organisations are understandably concerned to protect against the possibility of child abuse by 
their staff and, despite the limitations of the process, police checks are perceived as a reliable 
means of doing so, especially as they are free at the point of use.46 
 
The proposed response of the Government to this maladministration and misuse of the system was to 
give it full statutory footing47 and to expand it to other sectors. Whilst recognising that around 35% of 
men and 8% of women in the UK has at least one conviction by the age of thirty-five, and that it was 
‘common sense’ that rehabilitation prospects increase when ex-offenders are able to find 
employment,48 the paper rhetorically asked: ‘since a criminal conviction is a matter of public record 
when a person is found guilty, why not make convictions open to anyone willing to pay a fee to 
consult them’?49  
 
The disclosure criteria were again reviewed and it was suggested that checks should be expanded to 
include voluntary and charitable organisations and that checking could also include positions where a 
person has access to vulnerable adults.50 It was proposed that one way to reduce the number of checks 
being requested was to charge those applying for them, rather than the police bearing the cost.51 
Another proposal to reduce the load on forces was to take the responsibility for producing checks 
away from them entirely and to pass this to a new organisation. It was noted that discussion to this 
end had thus far considered mainly the possibility of a public body being created to administer checks, 
but, consistent with a decade-long Governmental policy of privatising long-standing public concerns, 
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45 Home Office, Disclosure of Criminal Records for Employment Vetting purposes, Cm2319 (1993) 
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47 Ibid. at 20 
48 Ibid. at 13 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. at 15 – 16  
51 Ibid. at 16 – 17  
it was mooted that ‘it is not clear that there is any reason in principle why private enterprise should 
not provide his service more efficiently than the public sector can’.52 
 
The thorny issue of disclosure of non-conviction material was revisited. The paper asked whether 
such material should be disclosed at all (noting that in Scotland it was not ever disclosed)53 and, if so, 
when it should; after all: ‘is it right that a person be denied a job – or a chance to volunteer – on the 
basis of information which has not been tested in court or which has been tested and found 
wanting’?54 If such information was to be disclosed, it was asked when it should be so done and if it 
might be advisable to create a two-tier disclosure process where there was a disclosure report merely 
containing conviction data and another which contained the same plus the additional non-conviction 
police intelligence.55 It was noted that the Crown Prosecution Service had already been sounded out 
about their possibly playing a role in determining what non-conviction data should be retained and 
released but that they had declined, arguing that it would impact on their impartiality if they were to 
play a role in the vetting process and, in any event, the police were happy to continue dealing with 
non-conviction data requests.56 
 
The importance of this paper to development of the vetting in England and Wales cannot be 
overstated. In many respects the review merely placed on official record what had become apparent 
over the preceding years. It recognised that vetting was no longer a marginal consideration. It noted 
that organisations and employers were increasingly reliant on criminal checks and that more and more 
organisations wanted access to them.  
 
Some of the recommendations for reform, however, were quite startling. The proposal for ‘open 
disclosure’ amounted to little more than a vetting ‘free-for-all’ with the opportunity to check people as 
a matter of course. While this represented a complete volte-face from the vetting policies of the 
1970’s, it arguably provided an accurate reflection of the prevailing attitudes of employers and 
voluntary organisations at the time. Of course, the question of whether employers should be entitled to 
more access simply because they wanted it never seemed to have significantly troubled the reviewers. 
Moreover, the damaging effect this would have on the rehabilitation prospects of a substantial portion 
of the working population seem to have been overlooked in an extremely blasé manner – universal 
vetting threatened a death-blow for the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. Unfortunately, those 
looking for checks and balances were looking forlornly. 
 
The proposal to remove vetting from the police was not new but the Government had seemingly 
resisted until it realised that the new organisation could be privatised – this was the first time such a 
position had been proffered – at which point the Executive position shifted sharply. Such an 
organisation could only realistically function if charging for certificates was introduced. If 
implemented, the notion of charging for certificates effectively turned criminal records data into a 
commodity to be bought and sold – an extraordinary postulation considering the sensitive nature of 
the data, the parlous state of the collation process and the previous policy disposition against 
disclosure of that data except in extreme circumstances.  
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Not only was the data to become a commodity, if the proposition to outsource the disclosure to a 
private organisation came to fruition, then that commodity would be turned into a ‘product’ to be 
bought and sold for profit to ‘customers’. Additionally, the failure to consider in full the process by 
which non-conviction information might be disclosed, or, perhaps more importantly whether such 
information should be disclosed at all, was a grievous one. Time would illustrate the significant errors 
of undertaking such a trifling level of discourse on this issue, which ultimately would result in the 
tarnishing of thousands of innocent individuals through the so-called ‘soft disclosure’ of non-
conviction material. The failures here would have serious ramifications, for individuals and the 
Government, in later years. 
 
The 1993 review marked a critical staging post so far as criminal records was concerned. From this 
point, vetting would either be restricted for the foreseeable future to the kind of small-scale operation 
undertaken for decades or it would be expanded exponentially. At this stage, it was difficult to predict 
precisely which way the die would fall. 
 
The legislative framework: The Police Act 1997 and creating the Criminal Records Bureau 
 
The 1993 review received some 180 responses.57 It took almost three further years before formal 
proposals were published. Much of the delay was attributable to the Government’s concern that the 
public might object to criminal records being commodified and a series of suspicious-seeming ‘leaks’, 
which looked to Thomas like ‘a sounding out process’, were made to the press.58  
 
However, the public reaction was again one of complete indifference and a White Paper was finally 
published on 19 June 199659 with a separate consultative document published almost simultaneously 
in Scotland.60 A three-tier disclosure process was proposed, with all employers in all fields entitled to 
apply for a ‘Criminal Conviction Certificate’ (‘CCC’) – a certificate providing details of all unspent 
convictions – whilst other, registered organisations would be able to apply for either a ‘full check’ 
(details of all convictions, spent or otherwise) or an ‘Enhanced check’ (spent and unspent convictions 
and ‘soft’, non-conviction intelligence held on local and national police records).61 It seemed that 
‘vetting-for-all’ had won the day. 
 
All of these certificates would be issued by a new, centralised Criminal Records Agency (‘the CRA’) 
who would have access to records centrally recorded on the Phoenix computer database.62 Those who 
intended to ask for full or enhanced checks would have to register with the new scheme and agree to 
adhere to a Code of Practice.63 The CRA would fund itself by charging applicants for their 
certificates. It was envisaged that CCC’s and ‘full’ certificates would cost either £5 or £6 each whilst 
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59 Home Office, On The Record: The Government’s proposals for access to criminal records for employment 
and related purposes in England and Wales, Cm3308 (1996) 
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62 J. Lourie, Police Bill [HL] [Bill 88 of 1996/97]: Access to Criminal Records, Research paper 1997/23 11 
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an ‘enhanced’ check would cost £8 to £10.64 However, it was proposed that the CRA would stay in 
public hands as part of the Home Office65 and would open in the middle of 1998.66  
 
These proposals formed part of the Police Bill 1996 which made its way through Parliament during 
the 1996 – 7 session. Concerns regarding the general availability of CCC’s, and the serious 
detrimental impact they might have on rehabilitating ex-offenders, were raised at the Second Reading 
stage67 but a suggested amendment to remove these from the bill was defeated at Committee Stage68 
and again at Report Stage.69 An amendment to provide free checks for those in the voluntary sector 
was approved by two votes, in spite of Government opposition.70 
 
The Police Act 1997 was granted Royal Assent on 21 March 1997, though the power to implement 
the provisions of Part V (where the new criminal records regime was set down)71 lay with the Home 
Secretary and, with a general election looming, it was not clear that the new mechanisms would ever 
come into force. The incoming Labour government initially prevaricated, reasoning that the new 
regime seemed to contradict their manifesto promises of social inclusion.72 Indeed, the new Home 
Secretary Jack Straw had reported his personal misgivings to Parliament from opposition as recently 
as February that year, stating that mistakes at a new CRA would be ‘catastrophic for public 
confidence and would undermine the purpose for which it was established’.73  
 
In the end Straw decided to press ahead. On 14 December 1998 he told Parliament that he had 
authorised the creation of a new ‘Criminal Records Bureau’ (‘the CRB’) to administer the regime 
under Part V of the 1997 Act. On the same day he informed the media that ‘dangerous people need to 
be stopped from working with children and young people. The creation of the CRB is an important 
step towards achieving that’.74 It was anticipated that the CRB would be operational within two 
years.75 
 
In the meantime, vetting remained the responsibility of the Police and their interpretation of the 
aforementioned Home Office Circulars. There was mounting evidence by this point that vetting had 
already extended beyond the permitted ‘child protection’ remit – the reality by February 2000 was 
that ‘in practice, checks are run on posts offering only the most marginal contact with children on the 
basis that “you can't be too careful”. In fact many local authorities are now departing from the 
guidelines completely and running criminal record checks on posts with no contact with children at 
all’.76  
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In the background, work continued on the CRB. The Government decided against incorporating the 
Bureau into the Home Office. It elected instead to institute a ‘Public-Private Partnership’, issuing a 
prospectus to potential bidders on 8 October 1999 with a formal start date of July 2001 for ‘Enhanced’ 
certificates only officially proposed on 16 December 1999. Standard certificates would begin to be 
issued in July 2002.77 On 21 December 1999, three bidders were shortlisted – Capita, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and e.CRES78 – and it was announced on 20 July 2000 that Capita had won 
the right to sell people’s criminal records for profit79 with a 10-year, £400m contract to do so signed 
on 3 August 2000.80  
 
By early 2001 it was abundantly obvious that attitudes towards those with criminal records has 
hardened: on 28 March 2001 a Select Committee on Home Affairs convened81 to review the progress 
being made on the CRB declared baldly that ‘those working with children or vulnerable adults will 
need to obtain a certificate showing that they have no criminal record’.82 So much for the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 or criminal records constituting one part of an informed 
recruitment process. The general hardening of views was succinctly put in May 2001: 
 
Most employers would like to know if their staff or prospective staff have criminal records, 
particularly where convictions relate to dishonesty. Trust and confidence is central to the 
employment relationship and many employers would be reluctant to employ an individual 
with a criminal record in case themselves, their clients or other employees become victims of 
similar offences.83 
 
This charge towards universal vetting came seemingly in spite of the fact that criminal records data 
remained in a wholly unsatisfactory condition. In July 2000, HM Inspector of Constabulary published 
a report on his review of the PHOENIX database and the quality of the records on it.84 He found that 
the problems of the early 1990’s persisted, with incorrect recording, missing data and incorrect 
classification causing records to be inaccurate for up to one year in some cases and an overall error 
rate of between 15 – 65% was found on inspected records.85  
 
The new CRB Chief Executive tried to mitigate the problem, telling Parliament that these problems 
included ‘every kind of error or omission, including the colour of people's eyes and the fact the 
postcode is missing, as well as the things that are very important’.86 The Home Secretary fielded 
supplemental questions in Parliament, stating that ‘the Home Office certainly does not have a defence 
against the charge that the police records system is seriously inadequate...This has been the case 
consistently for a very long period of time...It is a very bad state of affairs.87’  
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Nonetheless, the Government pushed ahead. Charles Clarke MP told Parliament on 6 February 2001 
that voluntary organisations would be able to apply for free certificates on volunteers once the CRB 
opened.88 Generous and well intentioned though this was, the ramifications of such a decision on the 
number of disclosure requests made should have been abundantly obvious. The Home Affairs Select 
Committee concluded a month after the announcement that ‘it is not possible to judge whether the 
decision to provide free checks for volunteers will lead to a substantial increase in estimated demand 
from the voluntary sector although we believe this to be likely’ and that ‘a contingency plan’ should 
be drawn by the CRB to cope with any surge in demand.89 This circumspect approach, even at that 
time, seems extremely naïve. The voluntary sector had, for over a decade, been a principal driving 
force in the expansion of the vetting regime, lobbying regularly and vociferously in favour of greater 
access to records. Quite why, therefore, neither Clarke nor the Select Committee were unable to see 
clearly the likely avaricious uptake of checks by those organisations remains a mystery. For everyone 
else, the cost of obtaining a certificate would be £12.90 
 
By 2001, the statutory framework for wholesale criminal vetting was in situ but the entire system was 
effectively in abeyance. While it was clear that there now existed a broad political consensus on the 
necessity of a regimented checking regime, the mechanisms responsible for implementing it remained 
beset with problems. Four years after the Police Act had received Royal Assent, giving statutory 
footing to the most complex and wide-reaching system of vetting yet devised in England and Wales, 
legitimate concerns regarding the quality of the raw data (which remained in an extraordinarily 
disorganised state), the balance to be struck between ‘standard’ and ‘enhanced’ checks and the 
necessity of providing voluntary organisations with a satisfactory mechanism for obtaining cost-
effective checks meant that political will for pressing forward was being superseded by the reality of 
opening for business in a state of practical unreadiness. This conundrum was summarised by the 
Select Committee when it declared that ‘it is more important for the Criminal Records Bureau to get it 
right when it does open than for it to start operating in July 2001, its original target date’.91  
  
The public awakening: Sarah Payne 
 
It would be unacceptable if errors on the Police National Computer let even one undesirable 
person through the checking system...The manifest levels of Police National Computer error 
make us doubt whether it can support a system of criminal records certificates.92 
 
The struggles of the Executive to make tangible progress were being exacerbated by a sharp upturn in 
public interest in vetting. While earlier attempts to engage the public in the vetting discourse had 
universally failed, by the turn of the 21st century, the public mood had noticeably shifted and indeed ‘a 
paedophile panic’, fuelled by exaggerated media reporting, was setting in.93  
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It is difficult to determine the precise origins of the panic. As early as February 1997, one editorial 
piece highlighted the ‘highly emotive’ nature of child sex offences and the dangers of public and 
legislative overreaction94 while Williams and Thompson noted in 2000 that residents of one estate: 
   
simply feared a paedophile presence, any paedophile presence, because of the way that the 
media had spent the last 20 years promoting a battery of irresponsible self-styled experts 
(frequently fêted and employed by police officers, social service personnel and charities who 
share their religious beliefs), and numerous other interested agencies who exploited the issue 
of child abuse to justify their existence...It was these ‘experts’ and organisations that had 
added the fuel to the flames by generating fears that paedophiles are everywhere and growing 
in number.95  
 
The traditional starting point, however, is the disappearance and murder of Sarah Payne. The eight-
year old girl was abducted by Roy Whiting on 1 July 2000 whilst she was playing outside her 
grandparent’s home with her older brother. Whiting drove off with Sarah in the back of his van and 
subsequently murdered her. He was convicted on 12 December 2001 and received a life sentence.96  
 
This case was reported by the media in an extremely lurid manner which evoked extremely strong 
public reaction and debate, much of which centred on the controversial News of the World campaign 
to list the names and addresses of sex-offenders in a so-called ‘name and shame’ campaign. This arose 
after it became known that Whiting had previously been convicted of a sex offence against a young 
girl and had been released from prison shortly prior to the attack on Payne. The public reacted to this 
development with unusual frenzy, with some citizens forming vigilante groups who conducted arson 
attacks on properties listed by The News of the World.97  There were reports that a paediatrician was 
attacked in her home after an angry mob were unable to differentiate a paediatrician from a 
paedophile98 and one newspaper claimed that a riot on a council estate was a result of anger caused by 
Sarah Payne’s murder.99 
 
The Payne case captured the public imagination in a way unseen since Marie Payne case almost two 
decades previously. From a strict legal perspective, the case cannot be said to directly relate to the 
vetting tale. No amount of vetting would have prevented Whiting, a local man, from committing his 
crime. But the outpouring of emotion which accompanied this case100 illustrated the significant public 
resonance in it, which in turn began to stoke the perception that citizens needed hitherto 
unprecedented governmental measures to protect their children.101  
 
The epidemic strikes: Soham and Bichard 
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The almost unprecedented public apprehension for the safety of children, coupled with the continuing 
failures of the legislature to implement a system of vetting to protect them despite over four years of 
planning and discourse, was brought into the sharpest imaginable focus by the actions of Ian Huntley 
in Soham in August 2002. Huntley had lived in Humberside for most of his life but by July 1999 he 
had changed his name by deed poll to Ian Nixon and had begun a relationship with Maxine Carr.  
 
In October 2001, Huntley successfully applied for a position as a caretaker at Soham Village College, 
Cambridgeshire, and he commenced work in mid-November that year; roughly the same time at 
which Carr moved in with him. By Easter 2002, Carr was working at the St Andrew’s Church of 
England Primary School in Soham and by the summer she was a classroom assistant to the year five 
class, where she came into regular unsupervised contact with young children, including two ten-year 
old girls named Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman. Huntley, by this time, had changed his name back 
to his birth-name.102 
 
In the late afternoon of 4 August 2002 the two girls were walking through Soham on their way to buy 
sweets when they passed Huntley’s house, where, it is presumed on the false pretext that Carr was 
inside, they were enticed in. Once inside, Huntley murdered them both. There was, contrary to some 
reports, no evidence of any sexual assault before or after the murders. Huntley then drove the bodies 
to a remote ditch and burned them before joining the increasingly frantic search for the girls, 
presenting for the thirteen days before his arrest a calm and concerned persona to neighbours and the 
media.103 Huntley was convicted of murdering both girls on 17 December 2003104 and sentenced to 
serve a minimum of 40 years imprisonment,105 with the judge iterating that Huntley has ‘little or no 
hope of eventual release’.106  
 
After his conviction, a public inquiry was convened to investigate the murders.107 It was through this 
inquiry that the systematic failing of the vetting processes became apparent. It transpired that Ian 
Huntley had come into contact with Humberside Police and/or Humberside Social Services in respect 
of eleven separate criminal incidents between August 1995 and July 1999. These involved a television 
licence fine and a burglary while the remaining nine involved allegations of sexual offences. The 
latter included three allegations of unlawful intercourse with fifteen-year old girls and a further 
allegation involving a girl aged thirteen. There were four separate allegations of rape and a further 
allegation of indecent assault of an eleven-year old girl.  
 
Huntley was not convicted of any of these alleged offences: the burglary case progressed to Court but 
prosecuting counsel believed that the police interview contravened the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 so the case was discontinued (though left to ‘lie on file’), while one of the rape cases 
progressed to court but did not reach trial after the CPS discontinued the case due to inconsistencies in 
the complainant’s evidence.108  
 
In relation to the ease with which Huntley obtained his position of employment, the inquiry found that 
the college had asked Huntley to complete the necessary form for a police check, which he did under 
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his present name of Nixon, and, despite Huntley’s significant police history, in January 2002 that 
check was returned with the words ‘no trace’ – in other words, there was nothing recorded.109  
 
In looking for explanations, the inquiry found that the records department of Cambridgeshire Police, 
who had processed the check request, was in disarray; short-staffed and short of trained staff, beset 
with sickness and disciplinary problems and faced with an apparently unanticipated increase in 
applications (presumably by those trying to get free checks before the paid CRB regime was 
implemented).110 The processing system in place was a complex ‘in-tray’ system where checks were 
processed on different systems by different staff and then moved on accordingly to a ‘foreign force’ if 
necessary.111 Bichard found that no formal written instructions for utilising this system were in 
place,112 that the system was ‘inconsistent’ 113and that ‘there was no adequate safety net to ensure that 
all of the checks had been properly completed’, including checking with ‘foreign forces’.114  
 
The result was a check on Huntley riddled with errors. After receiving the request on 8 December 
2001, Cambridgeshire Police added Nixon/Huntley to their Child Access Database (albeit with an 
incorrect date of birth entered).115 A check was then made on 9 December on one of the systems for 
both Ian Huntley and Ian Nixon, but nothing was found. A Police National Computer (PNC) search 
was made by a different member of staff who picked up the half-processed check from the in-tray 
system, on 21 December. This was made against ‘Ian Nixon’ but not ‘Ian Huntley’. The member of 
staff who failed to check both names had only been employed since 1 October 2001 and her 
supervisor had been off work through sickness for seven weeks.116 Even if the correct search had been 
undertaken, it would only have shown the burglary offence which was ‘lying on file’ and in any event 
the force admitted that it would have probably not disclosed it due to the nature of the offence, the age 
of the allegation, and overarching concerns regarding proportionality.117  
 
Ultimately, it was Humberside Police, rather than Cambridge Police, who held the details of the 
above-listed allegations. The inquiry found that a fault in the system at the material time made it 
impossible to know for certain if Cambridgeshire Police had asked Humberside Police to check their 
records118 but after analysing the fax records of the force Bichard concluded that ‘it is extremely 
unlikely that any ‘foreign force’ fax was sent by Cambridgeshire in respect of Huntley’.119 In any 
event, Humberside’s systems at that time were such that the information stored was only partially 
recorded at the time it was obtained and only some of that partially recorded data had been retained by 
2001. Additionally, the system used by Humberside to conduct checks did not include a search of the 
database where the allegations were recorded and the alias ‘Ian Nixon’ had not been added to their 
records. The net result was that, even if a ‘foreign force’ request had been made, it would have still 
been returned as ‘clean’.120 
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The Soham murders were a ‘disturbing’ and ‘horrifying’ crime121 which inspired considerable public 
revulsion.122 Press reporting of the case was rabid – in the summer of 2002, the Attorney General was 
moved to write directly to newspaper editors reprimanding their ‘frankly unacceptable’ coverage123 
and warning about possible contempt of court124 – but the vigilantism of the Sarah Payne case was not 
repeated. Instead, anger was turned against the authorities, whose apparent failings had allowed 
Huntley such a position of employment in the first place. 
 
From a vetting perspective, Soham was a perfect storm of inertia, misfortune, complacency and 
tragedy. Decades of poor practise had meant that criminal records were incomplete and inaccurate and 
this time the failure to update Huntley’s records, an issue which had been highlighted time after time 
by officials and academics, had resulted in a blank certificate being issued against a man who, even 
under the regime provided by the Circulars, would have almost certainly not been so cleared. A 
laissez-faire attitude as to who had checked what, when and how pervaded the entire system – 
inexperienced staff in understaffed departments shuffling papers between them without any real 
structure or rigour and it is difficult to shake the view that, for police forces, the production of checks 
was an administrative task which detracted from the real business of proper police work and (in the 
immediacy prior to Soham) was in any event about to be passed over to the CRB.  
 
The obvious lack of a conjoined strategy among even neighbouring police forces highlighted the 
limited value of the checks being produced and showed the naivety of employers/organisations who 
relied so heavily on them. The Bichard Report which followed Soham highlighted all of this and more 
and paved the way for a ‘one-stop-shop’ approach to vetting, including the barring lists on which the 
likes of Huntley would be included and the retention of almost all ‘criminal’ intelligence, not just 
conviction data. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to place Soham in its proper vetting context. It is often erroneously 
presumed that Soham (and, to a lesser extent, the Sarah Payne murder) triggered the creation of the 
modern vetting regime and the CRB to administer it but, as has been outlined at length, the modern 
regime was all but in place by 1998 and all that was left at the time of Huntley and Carr’s arrest was 
for the CRB to finally open. These high profile murders certainly hastened the perceived necessity for 
the new vetting regime, but they did not create it.  
 
Nonetheless, the importance of these murders is not that they created the regime. It is that they 
legitimised it. In the wake of these cases there was an almost universal acceptance among the public 
and the Executive that the benefits of the new system, with its ‘checks for all’ and its ‘enhanced 
certificates’ filled with hearsay, rumour and accusation, far outweighed any perceived concerns for 
rehabilitation, proportionality, privacy and the like. As Room said in January 2004: ‘in this post-
Soham world, it might be reasonable to conclude that the privacy angle will play a lesser role in the 
implementation of key child protection policies’125 before later declaring that arguments that the new 
system would destroy reputations on rumour ‘should prove to be unfounded scaremongering, and the 
system robust enough to sort wheat from chaff’.126  
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The vetting epidemic spreads: post-Soham 
Certainly, the protection of the public must come first. Criminals are not deserving of 
sympathy.127  
The CRB opened for business on 11 March 2002 and was fully operational by the summer of that 
year, issuing ‘standard’ and enhanced’ certificates.128 It was immediately inundated with tens of 
thousands of applications and chaos ensued when demand for certificates began to outstrip the 
capacity to issue them.129 By August 2002 the Bureau was processing around 24,500 disclosure 
certificates per week130 and by 15 February 2003 some 1,174,267 certificates had been issued.131 This 
had increased by 31 May that year to a total of 1,758,759.132 This was despite problems which meant 
that healthcare staff were not being checked.133  
 
Suddenly, and almost entirely as envisaged, vetting began to permeate into disparate tracts of society. 
A Home Office ‘Good Practice Model’ for children’s websites in 2003 insisted that online moderators 
be ‘properly screened and CRB checked’.134 In 2004 it was announced that solicitors who worked in 
child law would require CRB checks.135 Children’s charity ‘Fair Play for Children’ boasted in their 
2004/5 annual report that they had processed nearly a thousand applications, ‘almost all at the 
enhanced level’, in a wide array of fields such as religious groups, youth clubs, drama and dance 
groups, parenting groups and skate projects.136 In the financial year 2003/4, some 2,287,109 
disclosure certificates were issued.137  
 
This increased in 2004/5 to 2,434,290 (ibid) Wheel-clampers were required to undergo CRB checks 
from February 2005.138 In July 2005, the CRB told the press that 20,000 ‘unsuitable people have had 
job offers withdrawn’ as a result of disclosures made with 56% of these involving a conviction for 
‘theft or violence’.139 No-one seemed to think to ask what precisely was meant by ‘unsuitable people’ 
or to comment that ‘theft’ and ‘violent offences’ are very wide terms which cover everything from 
armed robbery to the shop-theft of an apple.   
 
Press hysteria seemed unrelenting – when Iorworth Hoare, the so-called ‘lotto rapist’, was ‘located’ 
by The Sun in Sunderland on 30 September 2005, the newspaper trumpeted that his neighbours ‘had a 
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right to know’ where he was. Local MP Chris Mullins noted in his diary that presumably this was ‘so 
that his house could be torched and he be lynched by a mob of shaven headed Sun readers’.140  
 
By 2006, vetting was practically everywhere. In January 2006 an ‘NHS Employers’ spokesman had to 
reprimand local hospitals who were conducting checks on support staff who had contact with patients 
rarely, if ever.141 The Telegraph reported in February 2006 that ‘an urgent review’ of home tutoring 
had been called for after it emerged that many firms were not subjecting tutors to CRB checks. A 
spokesman for the National Confederation of Parent and Teacher Associations described the situation 
as ‘scandalous’ and ‘yet another hole in the vetting procedure...the majority of parents would not have 
dreamt that agencies were not vetting tutors properly before sending them out for one-to-one sessions 
with children’.142   
 
That same month it was reported that Derby City Council were conducting checks on all new and 
existing teachers, in spite of official Department for Education guidance providing that existing staff 
need not be checked. One councillor dismissed the official guidance, stating that ‘we think we know 
our communities and parents better than central government’ and that the £100,000 spend required to 
ignore the guidance (which came from the education budget) was worthwhile so that the council was 
‘ahead of the game.’143  
 
Councillors in East Riding went even further, conducting CRB checks on every single teacher, 
support staff and governor within its remit and then requiring the process to be repeated every three 
years. When one head objected that such a process was extremely expensive and contrary to official 
advice, he was told by the council’s director of Children, Families and Adult Services ‘if this exercise 
uncovers just one member of staff who shouldn't be working with children, then I will be pleased’.144  
 
The paedophile menace seemed to be all-encompassing. The Football Association were conducting 
checks on anyone who applied to be a referee, regardless of the age group of the players they would 
actually referee. Taking their stance directly from media reports, the FA website stated that ‘it is best 
practice to complete a CRB check. It is obvious from information in the media that child abuse has no 
boundaries.145  
 
When Craig Wilson, a 26-year old builder, was jailed for grooming a 14-year-old he had met whilst 
working as part of a renovation team at her school, the National Confederation of Parent and Teacher 
Associations declared that builders and contractors must be checked. Indeed, a spokesman told the 
press that: ‘with builders on site, especially on a large campus, it is not possible to supervise them. 
They may come into contact with the youngsters. They will have the ability to get to know children 
while on site. If they decide to try to meet a pupil outside then the kids will think, ‘well, I know him 
because he has been working in school, he’s not a stranger’.146   
 
One survey showed that 67% of employers were conducting CRB checks on potential new employees. 
By comparison, the number of employers who checked academic qualifications was 56%. 33% of 
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employers claimed that the CRB check was ‘the most useful checking process’ available to them.147 
All solicitors were now being checked.148 Questions were raised in Parliament about the suitability of 
families to host foreign exchange students without their having been vetted first.149 In total, the 
number of disclosures made in the financial year 2005/6 disclosures was 2,772,929.150 By 2007, the 
number had risen to 3.3 million. 151 
 
Some individuals subjected to disclosures opted to pursue legal proceedings against the police forces 
who made them, affording the judiciary an opportunity to mitigate the overzealous expansion of 
vetting. It elected instead to facilitate it. In R (on the application of X) v Chief Constable of West 
Midlands Police152 a man of good character challenged a ‘soft disclosure’ to his employer of a 
discontinued case which had cost him his job in social care. His judicial review application was 
dismissed in the Court of Appeal by the Lord Chief Justice, who in doing so swept away the old 
common law presumption against disclosure and told police forces that such information should be 
disclosed ‘even if it only might be true’. This was justified as serving ‘a pressing social need’.153 This 
decision was roundly criticised and facilitated the proliferation of enhanced disclosure of non-
conviction material.154  
 
The inevitable result was that people were barred from employment or, in some cases where checks 
were conducted on staff in long-held position, dismissed Such a fate befell John Pinnington; another 
man of good character who lost his job as a deputy principal at a college for autistic children when he 
was asked to provide an enhanced CRB certificate to an employer he had worked with for many 
years. When the police made a ‘soft disclosure’ of sexual abuse allegations made against him which 
were so weak they didn’t result in any charge being brought, he was summarily dismissed and 
launched a judicial review.155 Despite admitting that ‘none of the allegations could be substantiated in 
a court of law’,156 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision to disclose and said that enhanced 
disclosures could only be challenged successfully if found to be Wednesbury unreasonable.157  
 
Conclusion 
This article has charted the metamorphosis of the vetting regime in England and Wales and 
demonstrates the direct correlation between legislative action on criminal checks and the gradual 
hardening of public opinions resultant from widely reported child-abduction cases. The murder of 
Marie Payne in 1983 brought, for the first time, the issue of criminal checks to wider consciousness 
which in turn saw triggered a hitherto unparalleled executive interest and involvement in the vetting 
regime. This culminated in radical proposals in 1993 to implement a centralized vetting system, 
commodify of criminal records and extend of checks into all spheres of public life through a policy of 
‘vetting for all’. These proposals effectively reversed all pre-existing vetting policies. These proposals 
were implemented entirely when Part V of the Police Act 1997 made its way onto the statute book.  
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The Government’s decision making process has been flawed. Under significant pressure from those 
with a vested interest in requesting criminal checks, the Executive failed to properly consider whether 
the desire for extended checks was justified in all circumstances. The fact that someone wants to see 
the full criminal history of an individual is not, per se, sufficient justification for allowing them to do 
so.  
 
The Home Office deferred too easily to those who wanted to check everyone for everything and failed 
to put into place effective mechanisms to ensure that checking would be relevant, proportionate or 
even justifiable. An aged conviction for shop theft committed as a juvenile is often irrelevant to a 
particular position and the disclosure of it is often disproportionate in very many cases. In their 
deference to the vested interests, the Government facilitated the development of a vetting epidemic 
which has caused significant damage to the rehabilitation prospects of many tens of thousands of 
individuals. 
 
It is clear that the legislative framework which has facilitated the widespread disclosure of criminal 
records is the result of a series of reactive policy decisions, rather than any long-term strategic 
planning. The Government made a significant error in allowing the narrative on vetting to be largely 
driven by the media. This was particularly so in the Soham case, where public anger was fueled by 
reporting which laid the blame almost in equal measure between the perpetrators and those who 
allowed them to be employed in positions where they might have access to children.  
 
The Government, faced with a rhetoric surrounding a ‘paedophile panic’, chose to accept its existence 
and react to it, rather than challenging the panic itself. In doing so they both facilitated it and failed to 
highlight a fundamental flaw in the media tale. Better vetting might have prevented Huntley from 
working as a caretaker in Soham, but there is no evidence to show that he would have been preventing 
from committing his crime were he employed elsewhere or indeed at all. While the desire of elected 
representatives to appease public anger by being seen to do something to prevent future occurrences is 
understandable, it led to decisions being made which lacked an empirical basis: there has been almost 
no examination of whether the blanket barring of individuals has resulted in a reduction in offending. 
 
These policy decisions facilitated among employers and other organisations a vetting ‘arms-race’: a 
desperate desire not only to conduct as much vetting as possible but also to be seen to conduct it lest 
anyone be accused on ‘letting another Huntley’ slip through the net. In their haste to prevent another 
Soham, however, politicians, the judiciary and employer’s seemed to forget the devastating toll that 
this vetting free-for-all was having on individual lives. People who had no contact whatsoever with 
children or vulnerable adults found themselves unemployed because of the inappropriate disclosure of 
old, minor offences or on the basis of unproven ‘soft’ intelligence. By 2007, that overarching policy 
was sufficiently well-entrenched as to have given rise to a vetting epidemic. 
 
However, hindsight has shown that by 2007, though the epidemic was well entrenched, the tide was 
beginning to turn. Dissenting academic voices began to surface. For example, Scorer asked; ‘is the 
furore surrounding sex offenders in schools a synthetic row stoked up by the tabloids and opposition 
politicians, or a genuine problem which the government has failed to address?’, noting with 
understandable concern that ministers in charge of the vetting mechanisms seemed to think that 
people accepting cautions were in some way ‘innocent’.158 That same year, pressure group The 
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Manifesto Club published a report159 which provided that ‘people are being vetted who pose no 
danger to children’,160 bemoaned the adverse impact vetting was having on volunteering161 and 
claimed that: 
 
the expansion of vetting both reflects and encourages the mistrust of adults. It implies that 
every adult is a potential abuser, and must be declared ‘safe’ before they are allowed to 
interact with a child. As a result, interacting with children who are not your own becomes a 
special procedure, requiring state clearance, rather than a normal part of being an adult 
citizen. This has a poisonous effect on relations between the generations.’162  
 
Judicial attitudes were also beginning to soften. In Pinnington, although the Court found itself bound 
to find against the applicant, it felt compelled to comment that:  
 
I am troubled by the fact that the claimant’s new employer in this case apparently operated a 
blanket policy of insisting on a ‘clean’ certificate…It is important that employers understand 
how low that threshold is and the responsibility that it places in practice upon them…. The 
operation of a blanket policy of insisting on a ‘clean’ certificate leaves no room for taking 
into account what the employee may have to say. That is a matter of particular concern.163 
 
Media reporting also began to soften and shift focus and disconcerting examples of inappropriate and 
over-zealous vetting came to light and the adverse effect of the vetting epidemic on individuals’ lives 
started to become apparent. Several news media reported the Pinnington case in a sympathetic 
light.164 In a separate instance, a gardener was dismissed from his employment when a CRB check 
showed he had a drink-driving and a theft conviction from more than a decade prior. His employer 
justified the decision on the grounds that ‘vulnerable adults lived on the estate where he was 
working.’165 
 
By 2007 the problems of overzealous, disproportionate and inappropriate vetting were beginning to 
come to light and critical scrutiny was at last beginning to form. As time began to both dim the anger 
over the Soham case and illustrate that such cases were as rare as they were inflammatory, it was clear 
that there was a growing mood that change might be implemented, if the political will to do so was 
forthcoming. When the Government began a legislative process to introduce legislative changes in 
2009 which would transform the rules regarding enhanced disclosures and the release of aged, minor 
conviction material, it became clear that 2007 was to prove the high watermark of the vetting 
epidemic. 
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